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1. Introduction  
 
Adelino Cattani’s conceptual analyses are aimed at developing a normative account of 
convincing as opposed to a theory of persuading. The Author builds his main line of argument 
upon the definitions of persuading (understood as an activity concentrated mainly on a speaker) 
and convincing (which is claimed to be “centred chiefly on the addressee and focused on one’s 
capacity of being convinced and of evaluating rationally”; see p. 1). Due to putting an emphasis 
on how convincing should be understood, the paper may be interpreted as an attempt towards 
providing its normative take. Cattani claims that convincing, as opposed to persuading, is  
a communication activity aimed at causing objective changes in someone’s belief set, whereas 
persuading is related to speaker’s techniques employed in influencing an audience. In this 
commentary, I will concentrate on issues related to  the lexical analysis (section 2), the 
differences between logic and rhetoric (section 3), and those between logos and ethos (section 
4). I will claim that the proposed method of lexical analysis does not have to exclude combining 
logic with rhetoric. More specifically, I will argue that the Aristotelian roots of understanding 
the communicative role of ethos may provide us with good arguments in favour of treating logic 
with rhetoric as legitimate components of the theory of rational and reasonable convincing.       
  
2. Lexical Analysis  
 
The approach presented in the paper may be interpreted as a normative take on conviction and 
persuasion. I am generally in favour of the approach that consists of analysing carefully the 
relations between the concepts the understanding of which is crucial to building elements of  
a theory of rational conviction – which is one of the main goals of Cattani’s paper. These 
concepts have been arranged in the paper using the following pairs of notions: logic – rhetoric, 
convincing – persuading, and polemics – dialogue.  
Cattani’s approach consists of giving “lexical evidence for a difference” between the 
key notions in English and in Italian (see, e.g. p. 3). This approach is claimed to be helpful  
in determining boundaries between logic and rhetoric, convincing and persuading, and dialogue 
and polemic. I agree that the careful analysis of the origins of the key notions may turn out  
to be helpful in capturing main differences, however, the question arises: are lexical analyses 
that point to some linguistically interesting differences between notions rather an inspiration 
for building the conceptual framework than a solution for the robust theory of convincing?  
A sample of this kind of lexical analysis can be found on p. 3: “Why do we lack of  
a lexicographic entry indicating the antonym of the act of ‘convincing’? This anomaly tells  
us a lot, and it is equally noteworthy that it does not exist the antonym of the verb ‘to dedicate’, 
which should hypothetically sound like *to dis-dedicate”. The lack of the antonym is claimed 
to constitute an evidence for distinguishing convincing from persuading”. I would agree that  
it may be some argument in favour of using the term ‘convincing’ to denote rational 
communication activities as distinguished from persuasion, but I would not say that it should 
constitute a foundation for the fully fledged theory of convincing. 
 3. Logic and rhetoric   
 
The important point of departure for Cattani’s theory of convincing is table on page 1 which 
points to ‘the positive and the negative traits’ of rhetoric. My impression is that this table also 
contains two different notions of rhetoric, namely: (i) rhetoric understood as an art of pure 
persuasion where goals other than persuading the audience do not basically matter in terms of 
successful communication; and (ii) rhetoric conceived as the art of rational persuasion 
undertook by means of speaker’s genuine ethos (the character of the speaker), strong and valid 
logos (correct reasoning), and adequate pathos (evoking proper emotions of an audience). 
Whereas some of the expressions from the first column of the table, by emphasising traits such 
as ‘vacuous speech’ or ‘manipulation’ clearly refer to the first notion (rhetoric as pure art of 
persuasion), a term vir bonus dicendi peritus (“a good man skilled in the art of speaking”), by 
pointing the speaker’s moral traits, refers to the second notion because the reference to speakers  
character (vir bonus).  
While referring to differences between rhetoric and logic, Cattani states: “we tend  
to keep distance from rhetoric, especially from rhetorical moves in favour of logical rules.  
In logical terms, we prefer to speak of ‘rules’, while in rhetorical terms we prefer to speak of 
‘moves’. Logical rules are clear and universally approved, while rhetorical moves are 
questionable and debatable” (p. 2). I agree that the distinction between rules and moves may 
tell us something interesting about logically and rhetorically driven argumentation. But,  
as a comparison, let us observe that designing dialogue protocols (e.g. Hamblin, 1970; Walton 
and Krabbe, 1995) are about the reasonableness of dialogue moves. In an analogous way, we 
can speak of the rationality of rhetorical moves.  
For instance, if a given rhetorical figure, such as synecdoche which consists of 
substituting a whole for a part or vice versa (see, e.g. Fahnestock 2011, pp. 101-102), may be  
a fair rhetorical tool used in order to emphasise the logos-related aspects of the speech by 
pointing to the most important part of the whole which could, for instance, constitute the core 
of one’s argument. Hence, mentioning rhetorical moves in the broader context of logos (as 
means that are not directly related to logos but which may emphasise the line of argument) does 
not seem to constitute an ultimate evidence for opposing rhetoric and logic. In a similar manner, 
we could point out some other figures of speech that are uses to emphasise logos. In other 
words, if we understand a rhetorical speech holistically, we may see that logos is not always 
separable from, e.g., ethos. This argument could serve as one against advocating the 
establishment of sharp boundaries between logic and rhetoric.     
However, apart from some clearly positive and negative traits of rhetoric that have been 
incorporated in the same table (p. 1), there are some other traits that do not seem to emphasise 
neither the ‘negative’ nor the ‘positive’ flavour of rhetoric. If we take, for example, traits such 
as ‘practice of persuasion’ and ‘discursive technique’ from the first column of the table 
(containing the negative traits of rhetoric), they seem to be rather neutral. A similar observation 
could seem to be true for the term ‘practice of persuasion’, unless one defines persuasion  
in a purely negative way and thus associates it with manipulative techniques. 
   
4. Logos and ethos   
 
Cattani also sketches a boundary between logic and rhetoric by means of ethical concepts: 
“Since ‘good’ means basically ‘honest’ and ‘logic’, we should determine if ethic and logic on 
one hand, and rhetoric on the other hand, are in conflict; if conviction and persuasion are really 
such different things; if the apology of dialogue (which seems to get along with logic) and the 
apology of polemic (which seems to get along with rhetoric) may coexist” (p. 3). This proposal 
seems to be opposed to from the Aristotelian account of rhetoric given in Book 1 of his On 
Rhetoric (Aristotle, 1991). Of course, logic has been long opposed to rhetoric, but given 
Cattani’s task of providing the foundations for a theory of rational convincing, the Aristotelian 
take could be possibly incorporated into his account. In other words, in my view there is no 
contradiction between establishing such a theory, and, at the same time, making use of 
Aristotle’s insights into the relation between logos and ethos. For instance, this relation is not 
only about logos being an indispensable element of the rhetorical speech, which seems to be 
just a starting point for further considerations.  
It might be here worth emphasising that the characteristics of ethos components, namely 
practical wisdom (phronesis), moral virtue (arete), and good will (eunoia) distinguished in On 
Rhetoric (Aristotle, 1991, pp. 112-113), also seems to be an argument against defining rhetoric 
as opposed to logic. When describing the lack of practical wisdom, Aristotle claims that “for 
either through lack of practical sense they [speakers] do not form opinions rightly” (p. 112). 
This example claim may show that despite of the fact that phronesis is a component of ethos,  
it may be claimed to be indirectly related to logos, as the practical knowledge constituting 
phronesis can also contain the knowledge of the rules of inference which constitute the core of 
logos. Being sympathetic to Cattani’s lexical approach discussed in section 2, I think it does 
not have to incorporate the treatment of logos and ethos as mutually exclusive concepts.    
 Despite the above issues regarding the relation between logos and ethos along with some 
concerns about confronting main concepts, a further systematic inquiry employing the lexical 
analysis outlined in the paper may lead to elaborating a detailed characteristics of rational 
convincing.               
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The work reported in this paper has been supported in part by the Polish National Science 
Centre under Grant 2015/18/M/HS1/00620. 
 
References 
 
Aristotle (1991). On Rhetoric. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Fahnestock. J. (2011). Rhetorical Style: The Uses of Language in Persuasion. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Hamblin, C.L. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen. 
 
Walton, D. and E.C.W. Krabbe (1995). Commitment in Dialogue. Basic Concepts  
of Interpersonal Reasoning.  Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.  
  
 
